Are the human sciences inseparable from the exercise of power?

1,819 words

March 14th 2024

Introduction

In this essay, I will be answering the question of whether the human sciences are inseparable from the exercise of power. In order to do so we must first define power. I will briefly summarize a few potential definitions before settling on, and making a case for, power in the way it is conceptualized by Michel Foucault. Next, I will discuss how power is, in fact, inseparable from the human sciences. I will do so with the help of the arguments of Foucault, Canguilhem, and Feyerabend. I will also take it a step further, finding support in these same great thinkers, to broaden the view from the human sciences, to all sciences. I will make the case that all sciences are shaped by power, and furthermore that this fact has worrying implications when we believe science to be wholly objective. But first, power.

What is Power

To begin, I will briefly discuss various definitions of power and what I believe to be their insufficiencies. These will include definitions from Weber, Dahl, and Lukes. Finally, I will discuss Foucault’s conceptualization of power and why I believe his to be more accurate and useful of those discussed. We will start with Max Weber, as his is one of the foundational definitions. He defined power as “The probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance”. (Weber, 1968) I take exception with this definition as I believe it misses the more nuanced and somewhat insidious forms of power that can happen by bending what people want to do without there ever being resistance. If someone has enough power, other people will acquiesce to them unconsciously in order to avoid conflict due to halo or expert biases where they truly believe what that powerful person wants must be the right thing. They wont even be aware they are doing so. I think, for this reason, that Dahl’s definition is slightly better. Dahl’s intuitive definition of “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do”. (Dahl, 1957) This conceptualization of power at least does not require conflict, which resolves the main issue I raised with Weber’s definition, but it can be difficult to measure still and I think Dahl’s attempts to calculate power dynamics leaves out a lot of hidden undercurrents that are not easily measured. It also is a bit oversimplified and does not take into account structural coercive power.

 Moving beyond this, Steven Lukes “third face” of power is more all-encompassing. He believes power can exist in institutions and groups, relatively independently from the people who make up those institutions and groups. This power can then shape people’s desires without conflict existing. In his work, Power: A Radical View, he states “[I]s it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing over of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?” (Lukes, 2005) This quote brings to mind another quote from philosopher Mark Fisher in his book Capitalist Realism (there is some question about where he himself attributes the quote too, it could be Zizek or Jameson) which states “It is easier to imagine an end to the world than an end to capitalism”. (Fisher, 2022) Both of these quotes illustrate how pervasive power can be in shaping our very thoughts and understanding of reality itself.

Finally, we come to Foucault. Foucault takes things further and continues the progression of the other thinkers mentioned in his conceptualization of power. Foucault speaks of “power/knowledge” or, as he says in the history of sexuality “It is in the discourse that power and knowledge are joined together”. (Foucault, 2020) With his studies of schools, prisons, military camps, and the like, Foucault shows the parallels between them and how power pervades all. This includes power warping knowledge itself. Hence them being tied together as knowledge/power.  For him, they cannot be separated and power relations are embedded in the very fabric of society They are reinforced and perpetuated through the creation and distribution of knowledge. This knowledge then shapes social norms and behaviors by positing what is considered “true” and “normal”. It can be seen, then, that Foucault’s conceptualization of power extends beyond many other conceptualizations of power and sees it as more diffuse, multileveled, and integral to the production of knowledge itself. In a section from Discipline and Punish in the Foucault Reader he states “In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production”. (Rainbow, 1991)

In a similar manner, Nietzsche criticized the way language shapes our perception of the world. He warned of our underlying assumptions and artificial categories that are built into the structure of language itself. This is illustrated in a quote of his from Twilight of the Idols “We enter a realm of crude fetishism when we summon before consciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language”. (Nietzsche, 2019) He warns us against becoming too attached to language and that we should recognize its limitations and how it shapes our perception. A point Chomsky would agree with in some respects, as seen in his work Manufacturing Consent. (Herman & Chomsky, 2010) Because language can have such a profound effect on our perceptions of the world, I do not think that it is far-fetched to consider how controlling language can exert power over knowledge. Attempts to control the language used is a choice tactic among propagandists as discussed in Manufacturing Consent.

I think the next step from Foucault’s concept of knowledge/power in the progression of thought that has been continuing throughout all these examples, would be to the work of one, Paul Feyerabend. This would also bridge the gap from “Human Sciences” as posed in the above question, to science more generally, as Feyerabend believed power could infiltrate all branches of science. But more on that in the next section.

The Human Sciences and Beyond

When one speaks of the “human sciences” generally one thinks about fields such as history, sociology, anthropology, psychology and the like. In contrast, the so called “hard sciences” like physics, astronomy, math, chemistry, and biology are often considered to above such power influences as they are considered to be objective. However, there are thinkers who call this assumption into question, including Paul Feyerabend. In order to link Feyerabend to the chain of thinkers we have been discussing thus far, we should first look at one of Foucault’s later works. His last paper in fact, entitled Life: Experience and Science in which he discusses the role of error in developing our concept of truth. He talks about how what we think to be rational now may turn out to be irrational under a new epoch. Madness or error can be what spurs a new epoch. In this paper he sings the praises of Georges Canguilhem, A French philosopher and physician in the fields of epistemology and the philosophy of science. Canguilhem argued that science was not some objective set of facts waiting to be discovered, but instead that it is constructed within our current historical, cultural, and social contexts. (Canguilhem, 2007).  It can be influenced by the values and social norms which Foucault, as stated in the previous section, believed to be inseparable from power.

In his paper on Canguilhem, Foucault mentions the example of Copernicus and the Copernican revolution. (Foucault, 1998) This same example is used by Feyerabend in his work Against Method. In this book, Feyerabend challenges the idea that there is a single universal method or set of rules to govern scientific inquiry. He argues for epistemological anarchism, in order that multiple, even contradictory, methodologies can coexist. I believe this complements Foucault’s idea of madness and error facilitating changes in epoch as Feyerabend’s main thesis is that strict constraints on science can limit creativity and innovation within the fields. He believes science should be more pluralistic as opposed to rigidly adhering to rules. This extends into the hard sciences as well. One of the main examples from Against Method being the Copernican revolution. He argues that, at the time, Copernicus was not following scientific methodology and his theory faced serious empirical challenges when compared to the prevailing Ptolemaic theory of the time. In fact, Copernicus employed unconventional methods and fell into many fallacies when building a case for their model and convincing others of its accuracy. It won by virtue of these fallacies more so than due to its scientific accuracy. (Feyerabend, 2010) This, again, goes back to Foucault’s point about madness and error issuing in new epochs of thought.

Regardless of whether you accept epistemological anarchy whole cloth, I think Feyerabend raises some interesting points which complement Foucault’s work and should be considered. Believing science to be objective and making personal and policy decisions based on this can have serious implications if what we believe to be objective is in fact influenced by power dynamics even in the hard sciences. Fields like phrenology were once considered to be objective science, and we can now see the worrying implications that something like that could have. So, whether we leave Foucault’s conceptualization of power with the human sciences or take it further, I think it is important to be on the look out for how power/knowledge may be at play.

Conclusion

In conclusion, in this essay, I answered the question of whether the human sciences are inseparable from the exercise of power. In order to do so we first defined power. I put forward several conceptualizations, each one building on that last, culminating with Foucault’s conceptualization of knowledge/power. Next, I discussed how power is, in fact, inseparable from the human sciences, finding support in the arguments of Foucault, Canguilhem, and Feyerabend. I also took it a step further, finding support in these same great thinkers, to broaden the view from the human sciences, to all sciences. I in fact made the case that all sciences are shaped by power, and furthermore that this fact has worrying implications when we believe science to be wholly objective. In closing, I think at least considering the work of Paul Feyerabend, building on the work of Foucault, with regards to the hard sciences can be beneficial in potentially preventing more phrenology-type scientific forays. Power can be insidiously pervasive, and similar to how Mark Fisher stated, sometimes it might be easier to envision the end of the world than the end of something so ideologically intertwined with our objective understanding of reality.

Bibliography

Allen, A. (1998) Rethinking Power, Hypatia Volume 13 No 1, pp. 21-40

Arendt, A. (1970. On Violence, Mariner

Canguilhem, G. (2007). The Normal and the Pathological. Zone Books.

Dahl, R. A. (1957) The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science, vol 2, no. 3, pp. 201-15

Feyerabend, P. (2010). Against method. Verso.

Fisher, M. (2022). Capitalist realism: Is there no alternative? Zer0 Books.

Foucault, M. (1998). Life: Experience, and Science. In Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984 (1998th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 465–477). essay, The New York Press.

Foucault, M. (2020). The history of Sexuality. Penguin Books.

Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (2010). Manufacturing consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. Vintage Digital.

Lukes, S. (2005) Power: A Radical View, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Lukes, S. (2011) In Defence of “False Consciousness”, University of Chicago Legal Forum, vol. 2011, art. 3, pp. 19–29.

Nietzsche, F. (2019). Twilight of the idols. Dover Publications, Inc.

Rabinow, P. (ed.) (1991) The Foucault Reader, London, Penguin

Weber, M. (1968) Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (eds) (trans. E. Fischoff et al.), New York, Bedminster Press.