Briefly explain and motivate the problem of dirty hands as stated by Walzer in the quotation below. What exactly is the problem and what is the best response to it?
2,446 words
May 8th 2024
Introduction
In this essay I will be explaining the concept of Dirty Hands as outlined in the following quotation by Waltzer:”Sometimes it is right to succeed, and then it must be right to get one’s hands dirty. But one’s hands get dirty from doing what it is wrong to do. And how can it be wrong to do what is right? Or, how can we get our hands dirty by doing what we ought to do?” (Walzer, 1973, p. 164). In order to accomplish this, I will describe what I believe the problem to be, explain some potential responses, as well as my own position which will be that of a naturalistic evolutionarily informed intuitionist ethics. I will further make my case by answering Coady’s five questions from his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Dirty Hands from this perspective. This ethical stance renders the paradox within the Dirty Hands problem inert.
Dirty Hands
What is the problem of Dirty Hands? The term itself was borrowed from Sartre, but the philosophical problem to be addressed here was articulated by M. Waltzer in his 1973paper. In this essay, when discussing politicians having to get their hands dirty, Waltzer described the problem thusly:“…this does not mean that it isn’t possible to do the right thing while governing. It means that a particular act of government (in a political party or in the state) may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong. The innocent man, afterwards, is no longer innocent. If on the other hand be remains innocent, chooses, that is, the “absolutist” side of Nagel’s dilemma, he not only fails to do the right thing (in utilitarian terms), he may also fail to measure up to the duties of his office (which imposes on him a considerable responsibility for consequences and out-comes).” (Waltzer, 1973) Basically, his point is that to do the right thing, one must also do the morally reprehensible thing, and it does not cease to be morally reprehensible just because it must be done. The doer is still guilty, but also did the moral action. So how can this contradiction then be rectified?
One example of a Dirty Hands problem given was that of Churchill’s decision during WWII to allow the Germans to bomb Coventry in order to hide that the Enigma Code had been deciphered. In doing so, he did something unethical, allowing for the death of 568 people, while also taking the ethical action of preventing countless more by maintaining a strategic advantage which could potentially swing the entire war in their favor. This is not simply, according to Waltzer, a question of a moral conundrum or a sticky ethical situation, or even a situation where there are no moral actions to take, but it is a contradiction that requires an answer. According the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “The structure of dirty hands is such that it seems to involve a contradiction or paradox. The advocate of dirty hands says in effect that it is sometimes right to do what is wrong, and this seems tantamount to saying that some act is both wrong and not wrong. But the dirty hands theorist is not saying that it is wrong in some respects and right in others, nor that what would normally be wrong is here right. Rather, it is the whole act in context that is both categorically wrong and not wrong” (Coady, 2024) This apparent paradox is the key aspect of Dirty Hands to be addressed.
Responses to Dirty Hands
This paradox has had many detractors who have answered it in various ways, a few of which are to follow below.
1.Consequentialism dissolves the problem, as the moral action is merely that which brings about the best result and there is no contradiction, but raises many issues itself. For one thing there must be a clear goal in mind with which to base one’s utilitarian calculations upon. Manyversions of hedonistic calculus have attempted to remedy this, but there are further issues as we are not omniscient beings. We cannot see the butterfly effects of our actions through time. If there were some “correct” action to take (when viewing the world without time and with some justifiable end goal) then one could make a case on consequentialist grounds, but without those the theory falls flat. Kai Nielsen’s also proposed an answer with his weak consequentialism. (Nielson, 2007) It holds that consequences should be factored into an ethical decision but does not, unlike utilitarianism more generally, believe them to be the primary consideration. He manages to avoid some of the problems with consequentialism but does not ultimately, in my mind, put forth a fulfilling ethical theory.
2. Nietzsche would call this problem an illusion of slave morality. He would reject the ressentiment based illusion forming the foundation of the deontological theories giving rise to the “conflicting” moral actions, once done there is no paradox in need of a response.
3. Machiavelli gives many examples of situations where getting Dirty Hands is necessary in order to maintain and execute power in a principality without acknowledging aparadox. Even the term “Machiavellian” only seems to have earned its negative connotations based in a specific objective understanding of ethics. Upon reading the book I was surprised at how pragmatic the book was and not cruel as I had anticipated. The main issue here seems to be, as Walzar relates in his article, that it’s not a matter of what Machiavelli is saying being wrong, but he’s simply not castigating himself enough for prescribing it. (Walzer, 1973)But most likely Machiavelli, like Nietzsche, would not accept that there is a paradox inherent in the problem and that the right action is simply the right action with no need to feel morally guilty for the doing what was required to bring about the necessary ends.
4. Michael Stocker, in his book “Plural and Conflicting Values,” offers an Aristotelian approach to solving the problem. He employs ethical reasoning and balance to determine the correct moral action in a given situation (Stocker, 1991). According to this perspective, moral actions represent a balance between vice and virtue, requiring cultivation. Under this ethical framework, there are no specific principles whose violation would result in “dirty hands,” thus avoiding contradictions. I ultimately disagree with this approach as I don’t believe we have as much conscious control over our moral feelings, beliefs, and actions as conventional wisdom often suggests.
5. Ethical intuitionism is a philosophical theory which suggests that we have an intuitive understanding of ethical and moral behaviors. According to this view, right and wrong behaviors are self-evident and do not require empirical evidence or rational deduction in order to be understood. Instead, humans possess an innate sense of morality which allows them to recognize moral truths. (Stratton-Lake, 2020) Under this school of ethics, the Dirty Hands problem may test our moral intuitions, challenging us to uphold our deepest moral convictions in the face of difficult circumstances, but, importantly, it would not hold that there would be a paradox as it is not based on deontological principles which cannot be violated regardless of consequences.
My Interpretation
I believe a naturalistic, evolutionarily informed, intuitionist ethics to be the most defensible. This is not without its own issues, one of which being its descriptive nature, which can leave us wanting in our philosophical search for an ethics which will help us to prescribe behaviors, as well as it’s proclivity to fall into various logical fallacies when being applied to explain specific phenomena. However, the work of Johnathan Haidt and his Moral Foundations Theory offers evidence for intuitionism. He breaks down the biological basis for our moral feelingsand how they stem from base dichotomies like care/harm, fairness/cheating, sanctity/degradation, and others. (Haidt, 2013) From this breakdown, he can for example, use a quiz regarding feelings of disgust (sanctity vs degradation) and then use the answers to fairly accurately predict where someone fall on a political spectrum. (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, Haidt, 2012) This is further evidence that our moral intuitions arise from our visceral unconscious and biologically based feelings which are only later justified rationally in order to explain our feelings to others. I believe these intuitions are a part of a larger evolutionarily shaped algorithm which guides behaviors. This algorithm incorporates some consequentialist style reasoning as well as some deontological, which are innate but also malleableand thus can be shaped by the specific culture and environment a person finds themselves in during development. This is part of why one’s family, upbringing, and culture seem to correlate so strongly with one’s ethical views. More support for this theory comes from the book Algorithms to Live By, which breaks down some specificdecision-making algorithms that people use such the 37% rule. This is used in response to the optimal stopping problem, one example of which is how to know when to settle down with a partner, knowing you could potently meet someone in the future who fits you better. There is a mathematical answer which would give the best results the majority of the time, that answer is the 37% rule. This rule states you should reject the first 37% of whatever pool (in this case the available dating pool), and after that you should marry the first person who is better than the options you have seen so far. (Christian & Griffiths, 2021) There are many other problems like this in the book, and interestingly enough, people do seem to often tend towards these mathematically advantageous strategies completely unconsciously. Game theory can be a great tool for helping to break down how, on average, people will behave in various situations. This includes our moral reasoning. So, going back to the dirty problem at hand, how would an ethical intuitionist of the vein I have been describing, one who has an evolutionarily informed algorithmic descriptive sense of ethics, answer some of the questions raised regarding the question of Dirty Hands?
In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the subject of Dirty Hands, Coady poses 5 questions. I will answer these questions now:
1. First, there is the question whether the dirty hands scenario makes any sense at all; perhaps it is just a muddle.
From the above perspective, it would in fact just be a muddle. Much like how Wittgenstein dispels “language games” in philosophy, or how when presented with Zeno’s Paradox, Diogenes simply walked away, (Huggett. 2024) I believe the supposed paradox within the Dirty Hands problem is merely a linguistic illusion built on the inherent flaws of a deontological ethical system.
2. Second, there is the related question whether the overriding that dirty hands involve (or purport to involve) takes place within morality or somehow beyond it.
The problem of Dirty Hands itself only takes place within a specific morality, thus it can be viewed from a meta level because it only exists within certain moral frameworks like deontology (speaking of the paradox specifically). Something like a Nietzschean transvaluation of values, for example, can overcome it. This does not require a God’s Eye view of morality from beyond the universe, because it is within a subcategory of ethics very much inside our own sea of potential ethical schools.
3. Third, there is the question whether dirty hands are necessitated only or primarily by politics.
They are not only necessitated by politics, but due to the nature of politics they are often more prevalent there. I would argue they are also more prevalent in law as well. Coady reasoned that this is due to Compromise, Extrication, and Moral Isolation, which tend to be relevant factors in politics and law, but also in everyday life on occasion.(Coady. 2024)
4. Fourth, how are the circumstances that call for dirty hands best described?
Situations where it is difficult to determine the best course of action due to the balancing of goals with questions of socially appropriate behaviors and one’s internalized moral compass. Basically, this entails circumstances that require rectifying conflicting moral intuitions due to them being outside the scale of normal algorithmic heuristic responses humans are more prone to and to which our intuitions evolved.
5. Fifth, there is the issue of the relation of the dirty hands problem to that of moral dilemmas and the requirements of some form of moral absolutism.
I do not believe there is a necessary distinction between the Dirty Hands problem and any other moral dilemma, outside perhaps of scale and complexity. Unless one subscribes to a form of moral absolutism, there is no moral paradox demanding an answer. That’s a problem for that ethical system, not a metaethical problem outside that system.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I began this essay by examining the quote from Waltzer and reviewing some examples of the Dirty Hands problem. Next, I described several potential responses to this problem and ultimately my own interpretation and answer. I did this through answering Coady’s five questions from a naturalistic evolutionarily informed intuitionist ethics perspective, which dispels the problem of Dirty Hands by demoting it to a normal, though perhaps larger scale and/or more complex, ethical dilemma.
Regardless of one’s stance on the legitimacy of the contradiction apparently inherent within dirty hands problems, they are undeniably compelling. A large percentage of our media seems to focus on these types of questions. From The Dark Knight, to Game of Thrones, and basically any zombie movie, we seem to love watching characters grapple with these types of issues. Ned stark lost his head and threw the entire kingdom into disorder by refusing to get his hands dirty. Often, in post-apocalypticmedia, a main storyline aspect is the morally good leader having to learn when to engage in ethically dubious behavior in order to save his group, a lesson usually come by painfully. Dismissing the inherent contradiction in the dirty hands problem does not diminish its compelling nature. But although I believe them to be compelling, interesting, and necessary conversations, I do not believe they signal an inherent philosophical contradiction or paradox that requires answered. At times, we may become overly focused on linguistic intricacies and overlook the fact that words alone do not possess mystical powers. Simply creating a linguistic contradiction does not necessarily imply a substantive problem. It is imperative that we exercise caution in not overly privileging the significance of our language to the extent that we engage in arguments that detach us completely from reality, leaving us seemingly without recourse. In such instances, it may be prudent to draw inspiration from Diogenes and, at least metaphorically, walk away.
Bibliography
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Coady, C. (2024) “The Problem of Dirty Hands”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/dirty-hands/>.
Haidt, J. (2013). The Righteous Mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Penguin Books.
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Inbar Y., Pizarro D., Iyer R., Haidt J. (2012). Disgust sensitivity, political conservatism, and voting. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci.3:537–544. 10.1177/1948550611429024
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Nietzsche, F. (2017 [1887]) “On the Genealogy of Morality and other Writings”, 3rd edn, Ansell-Pearson, K. (ed.) (trans. C. Diethe), Cambridge University Press.
Stocker, M. (1991) “Plural and Conflicting Values”, Oxford University Press.
Stratton-Lake, P. (2020) “Intuitionism in Ethics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/intuitionism-ethics/>.
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Walzer, M. (1973) “Political action: the problem of dirty hands”.Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 160-80.
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